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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALFRED ROGER MOORE,

Respondent,
vs.
Case No.

THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Appellant.

8284

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit was brought under the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act. By his complaint, Plaintiff,
Alfred Roger Moore, sought damages for a ruptured intervertebral disc, straining and spraining of the spine, and
other alleged elements of damage. The case has been tried
two times. At the close of the first trial the jury returned
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a verdict for plaintiff in. the sum of $12,500.00 The trial
judge set aside this verdict and granted a new trial. On
th~ second trial the jury returned a verdict for $35,000.00
less $17,500.00 dimunition for contributory negligence, making a net award of $17,500.00. The trial court thereupon
entered judgment on the verdict and subsequently denied
defendant's motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9, 1951, Moore and a fellow employee, Lyle
Nichol, were working for the defendant Railroad clearing a
cut, through which defendant's tracks pass, approximately
three miles east of Range, Colorado. Moore's responsibility
was to see that Nichol, who was operating a small shovel
device known as a "huff loader," was informed of trains
approaching the cut. About 11:00 o'clock a.m. Mr. Zellard
Summe·rfield, another employee of defendant, came to the
location where Moore and Nichol were working and instructed them to load the machine which Nichol was
operating, and a large huff loader tire and wheel, onto a
flatcar. The accident of which Moore complains occurred
during the loading of the tire and wheel.
The testimony of Moore and of Nichol as to the manner
in which they attempted to load the tire and wheel onto
the flatcar is in large part conflicting. Both agree, however, that the· huff loading device was used to lift the tire
from the ·ground to the elevation. of the flatcar. The two
men planned to 'accomplish the lifting of the tire by placing it in the bucket or scoop of the loader and operating

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

the lifting mechanism until the tire was raised to the desired level at which time it could be dumped onto the flatcar.
(A huff loader is a four wheel vehicle with heavy tractor
type rear wheels and a shovel or bucket mechanism attached
to the front which can be raised vertically for several feet
above the level of the ground.) (See Ex.'s P-1 thru P-7.)
Since the tire was too large to fit completely into the
bucket, it was decided that Moore would hold the tire to
prevent its falling out of the scoop while ·Nichol operated
the lifting device. Moore testified that in order to hold the
tire into the scoop he placed one hand on either side of the
tire at about his shoulder level (R. 28), and that when the
bucket had been raised to his knee level ( R. 30) the tire
tipped toward him causing him to lose his balance (R. 31)
and causing the tire to roll off ( R. 32) of his arms to the
ground. The weight of the tire as it "rolled off" of Moore's
arms "hurt my back," said Moore (R. 31). Tipping of the
tire according to Moore's testimony (R. 31) was caused by
the moving of the huff loader while the lifting device was
in operation. Nichol denied that the loader moved backward while the tire was being lifted, stating that it could
not have moved under the circumstances (R. 185).
After this incident according to Moore's own testimony,
he "picked up the tire and brought it around, and put it in
the bucket again in the same manner" (R. 32). On the
second attempt the tire was lifted successfully. The "injured" man then assisted (R. 105) in the loading of 400
pound timbers onto the railroad car (R. 208). Defendant's
witnesses testified that Moore: did not complain to them
on the day of the alleged injury (R. 180, 209), and Nichol's
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testimony was that at the time of the incident there was
no indication by Moore's manner or movement that he had
been injured (R. 180). Plaintiff's testimony, however,
was to the contrary (R. 32, 34).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
16 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT
WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH THEY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD SUSTAINED A RUPTURED INTERVERTEBRAL DISC AS A PROXIMATE
RESULT OF THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE 9TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1951.
(a) There was not sufficient evidence of the ex-

istence of a disc injury to go to the jury.
(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a causal

connection between the accident and the alleged disc injury.
(c) The trial court's refusal to

withdra~v

the issue
of a disc injury from the jurors' consideration
was prejudicial.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 12 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE INSTRUCTED
THE TRIER OF FACT THAT PLAINTIFF'S
ONLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT RAILROAD.

POINT III.
THE ·TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13 INVOLVING AN ISSUE
NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR
THE EVIDENCE AND NOT BEFORE THE
COURT OR THE JURY.

POINT IV.
A GROSS AWARD OF $35,000.00 FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED INJURIES IS SO EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE AS TO COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL. COURT
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S ' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT.'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
16 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT
WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH THEY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD SUSTAINED A RUPTURED INTERVERTEBRAL DISC AS A PROXIMATE
RESULT. OF THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE 9TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1951.
The most serious injury of which plaintiff complains
is a "ruptured intervertebral disc in the lower lumbar
region of his. spine" (R. 3-4). While there was testimony
sufficient, if be1ieved, to show a back strain or sprain (as
alleged), the only evidence tending to prove that plaintiff
suffered a disc injury was the testimony of plaintiff's
single expert witness, Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg's testimony indicated that there was a "possibility" that plaintiff was
suffering from a ruptured intervertebral disc. Objections
to the admission of tris testimony were overruled. At the
close of the evidence defendant requested the trial court
to instruct the jury that there was no evidence upon which
they could base a finding that the· plaintiff suffered a ruptured disc as a result of the accident. The trial court refused
the requested instruction and exceptions were duly taken
( R. 254, 256 and 263) .
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This appeal does not challenge the admissibility of the
doctor's speculative testimony; the only issue in connection
therewith is whether the doctor's testimony, standing alone,
is sufficient evidence to justify the trial court in allowing
the jury to consider whether plaintiff had sustained the
alleged disc injury.
As plaintiff, it was incumbent upon Moore to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence every essential element
of his cause of action including the items of damage alleged.
That no recovery may be had for damages unless they are
shown with reasonable certainty, and are proved to be
the direct, natural and proximate circumstances of the defendant's wrongful act, is elementary. 15 Am. Jur. 410,
25 c. J. s. 493.
A common statement of the rule is set forth in S. H.
Kress and Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650, 68
A. L. R. 167, where it is said:
"It is a statement of the rule generally found
in the books that the damages recovered in any case
must be shown with reasonable certainty both as

to their nature and in respect to the cause from
which they proceed. In a case like this [personal
injury], that general statement is qualified by the
additional statement that the consequential damage
and the extent thereof must be established as a
reasonably certain probability." (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar plaintiff alleged as one ele·ment of
damage, a ruptured intervertebral disc injury. It was his
burden therefore to prove ( 1) that he was suffering from
such an injury; and (2) that it was caused as a direct and
proximate result of the defendant's negligence.
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(a) There was not sufficient evidence of the ex-

istence of a disc injury to go to the jury.
The very nature of the alleged injury, being internal,
with only subjective symptoms, requires the testimony of
an expert to establish its existence. As was said by the
Mississippi Court inS. H. Kress & Co. v. Sharp, supra:
"The case is not one of external injuries, where
the court and jury could see them and know the
extent thereof. It is solely of internal injuries, and
presents a case where the information given the
jury should be full, as well as dependable and cogent,
out of all fairness to the Court as well as to the
defendant, who is usually largely helpless and dependent in such cases."
So it is in the present case. Moore's testimony, while
adequate, if believed to show the alleged back strain, does
not tend to prove that he suffered from a ruptured intervertebral disc. Whether or not he sustained such an injury
is certainly not within the grasp of the common mind, and
under the particular circumstances of this case, even the
expert with the aid of the history related by Moore, was
unable to detern1ine whether there was a probability of such
an InJury.
It is well established that where an injury is of such
character as to require skilled men to ascertain the nature,
extent and/or cause thereof, the question is one of science
and the injury must be proved by the testimony of experts. See, e.g. Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P.
2d 91; Vaden v. Holmes, 39 Cal. App. 2d 580, 103 P. 2d 1002.
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The only expert testimony offered to prove the alleged
disc injury was given by Dr. Reed Clegg. The sufficiency of
evidence tending to prove the existence of such injury must
therefore stand upon his testimony. The doctor's testimony
follows ( R. 63-65) :
Doctor, assuming this man was injured on
August 9, 1951, and he was in the process of loading
a big heavy tire, weighing anywhere from 3 to 5
hundred pounds, onto a sort of a shovel, that came
down and caught much of the weight in his arms,
causing him to lean over to the side, and he felt a
sharp pain in his back, assuming that he had not
had any trouble with his back before that time,
assuming these things, and what you found on your
examination, would you have an opinion as to
whether this condition you found in his back, was
caused by the accident which I referred to?
"A. I d o.
"Q.

What is your opinion?
"A. All I could say is that it is possible that
the accident could either initiate it or . . .
"Q.

"MR. ASHTON: Just a minute, doctor. We
object, your Honor, it is conjectural and a possibility, not any probative value.
"THE COURT: That objection will be sustained to the statement as made.
(Mr. Roberts) Do you have an opinion
-a medical opinion, in connection with this matter.
"A. I do.
"Q.

Without using the word 'possible'-we, do
not have a choice of words, legally speaking-do
you have an opinion, doctor, without putting it in,
"Q.
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as assuming these things which I have related to
be true?
''MR. ASHTON: He has said 'possible' your
Honor. Mr. Roberts is asking him to change his
testimony.
"MR. ROBERTS: The record will show what
I am doing.
"MR. ASHTON: It does, your Honor, and the
doctor has said 'a possibility.' If the doctor wants
to change his testimony-he has now indicated a
possibility.
"THE COURT: Proceed.
"A. In medicine, we cannot come out definitely on things, very often and say absolutely definitely that such-and-such a condition is so-and-so, but
we usually qualify our diagnosis, because sometimes
we get fooled, and we· use the word 'possible' and
that is all I can probably state. I cannot say definitely that this is probab.ly or definitely that it is. It
is just a possible condition; that was my opini()'fl,.
(Emphasis added.)
"Q.

"A.
•

(Mr. Roberts)
Yes .

Is that your opinion?

Now do you have an opinion as to what
is causing this nerve irritation as you describe it?
"A. I do.
"Q.

V\Till you give us your opinion on that?
"A. Again it is a possibility. It is my opinion
that this is poss"ibly due to pressure on the nerve in
the lower spine, due to irritation from a disc." (Emphasis added.)
"Q.

The doctor repeatedly affirmed throughout his testimony
that a disc injury was only a "possibility" (See R. 66, 73,
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82). The quoted testimony clearly indicates that the doctor
was not prepared to testify that there was even a medical
"probability" of such an injury.
There is a marked contrast between the quoted testimony and other testimony given by Dr. Clegg. Earlier in
the trial he had testified (R. 61) :
"A. I felt, with the other findings such as
limitation of straight leg raising, and limitation of
forward flexion, in an attempt to touch the floor
without bending, the knees, and with the very slight
variation, slight X-ray changes that were present,
and following the subsequent examination on the
2nd day of March, 1954, it was my opinion that Mr.
Moore had irritation of the nerves of the lower spine
.... " (Emphasis added.)
This detailed listing of the symptoms and the conclusion that "it was my opinion" is probably definite enough
to support a finding by the jury that there was some nerve
irritation even though the doctor necessarily relied for his
conclusion entirely upon his analysis of the symptoms.
The testimony offered to prove a disc injury was also
necessarily based upon the ascertainable symptoms, the history, and the "entire picture" (R. 80), but, notwithstanding
this, the doctor was able to conclude with respect to the
disc injury only that "It is just a possible condition" (R.
64). This testimony, we submit, is not sufficient to support
a finding of a disc injury.
Diagnosis of a disc injury need not be speculative if
there is sufficient evidence for the medical expert to work
with. See, for example, the detailed listing of symptoms
and tests observed and made by the medical expert in the
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case of Mickel v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 991, 156 S. W. 2d
721, 728. In that case the doctor was able to make a positive and direct diagnosis of a disc injury, leaving no room
for speculation. The doctor's testimony in the present case
falls within the category of speculation, conjecture and
surmise.
It is recognized, as testified, that "very often" doctors "cannot come out definitely on things" and sometimes they cannot even state that there "probably" is such
an injury. The inadequacy of science, however, in such
cases. is no justification for submitting the question to a
lay· jury. When medical testimony fails to establish more
than a "possibility" of injury and there is no other corroborating evidence the plaintiff has failed to prove to a
reasonably certain probability, his damage. We have found
no cases which dissent from this proposition.
A case in point is Halnan v. New England Tel. & Tel.
296 Mass. 219, 5 N. E. 2d 209. In that case plaintiff
sought recovery for injuries sustained by him while he
was in the employ of defendant. One of defendant's witnesses testified that an expert called by plaintiff. had "expressed the opinion that it was possible that there was a
pin point fracture in the skull through which inter-cranial
fluid might be· escaping and that as a result of the blow
on the head there might be inter-cranial pressure." At the
close of the evidence defendant requested a ruling that there
was "no evidence from which the court would be justified
in finding that tpe plaintiff as a result of the accident ...
suffered any increase in inte·r-cranial pressure or leakage
of inter-cranial fluid." The trial court refused to so rule
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and an appellate court affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts it was held that the refusal to grant
the requested ruling was prejudicial error. The court said:

"The testimony of an expert witness merely
that a described condition is 'possible' or 'might'
exist as a consequence of a stated cause does not
support a conclusion that suck a condition exists as
a result of that cause. De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass.
531, 534, 188 N. E. 245, and cases cited. Even if the
plaintiff's expert had given such testimony from
the witness stand it would not warrant a conclusion
that as a result of the accident the plaintiff suffered
any increase in 'inter-cranial' pressure or leakage of
'inter-cranial' fluid . . . There was no evidence justifying the trial judge in finding that the condition
existed." (Emphasis added.)
In Lyons v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill. 75, 101 N. E.
211, plaintiff's medical witness testified "I formed the
opinion that he might have a fracture of the anterior fossa,
which is above the eye-a fracture of the bone-for the
reason that the injury to the eye (the bloodshot eye appearance) appeared late. It did not appear immediately, as it
does after a direct blow. It appeared between the third
and fourth day ... I could not have an absolute opinion on
that without an X-ray plate showing that fracture of the·
orbital plate." The trial court allowed the jury to consider
the evidence and on appeal this was held to be prejudicial
error. The court, discussing the development of the opinion
rule, said:
"While it is often difficult to draw a line between legitimate inference and bare conjecture, only
such inferences may be drawn as are rational and
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natural. (Citing authorities.) Mere surmise or conjecture is never regarded as proof of a fact, and
the jury will not be allowed to base a verdict thereon.
If a witness has not sufficient and adequate means
of knowledge, his evidence should not be considered.
(Citing authority.)
"If this physician had testified that, from his experience in such matters, his judgment was that
there was a fracture of the frontal bone, such evidence, under the authorities, might have been admissible."
The Utah court is committed to the same doctrine; i. e.
that a mere "possibility" is not sufficient where the plaintiff has the burden of proving his case by a preponderance
of the evidence. In Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929, this court, upsetting an
award of the Industrial Commission said:
"There is no positive or direct statement on the
part of the physicians testifying that in their judgment the accident did accelerate the disease which
caused death . . . nor any fact proven from which
it might legally or reasonably be deduced that the
accident did accelerate the disease."
The court in the Salisbury case was talking about the degree
of proof required to prove the casual connection between a
known disease, disability or death and the accident. The
burden of proof is the same, however: plaintiff must show
to a reasonably certain probability that he was suffering
from the alleged injury, and also that the alleged injury was
the proximate cause of the accident.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

e.

The rule laid down in the Salisbury case, i. that the
medical testimony must be "positive and direct" or it must
be corroborated by other evidence is recognized in the later
cases. In Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission et al.,
102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, this court, referring to the
Salisbury case and distinguishing it on the fa-cts said :
"In that case there was no opinion of the physicians that the accident did accelerate the chronic
heart disease. They only went so far as to say it
might have done so. Therefore the event of the accident could be connected with the event of the death
according to the view this court then took of the
matter, only by conjecture, and not by evidence·.
This court in that case went on to say 'nor is there
any fact proven from which it might legally or reasonably be deduced that the accident did accelerate
the disease.' In this case there are such facts. The
specific member was injured and from that time
on grew progressively worse until death."
The Utah Fuel case affirms the proposition that "might
have" is not enough.
In a still more recent case, Thomas & Dee Memorial
Hospital Association et al. v. Industrial Commission et al.,
104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233, this. court, though holding that
the evidence was sufficient to support an award, again declared:
" .. merely showing a possibility ... will not suffice." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P. 2d 331, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with
approval the above language, but vacated the decision of the
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Industrial Commission denying compensation because they
found that there was ". . . more than a mere possibility"
(Emphasis added).
The above cited Utah cases were reviews from decisions
of the Industrial Commission. Yet, notwithstanding, the
policy in such cases, that "doubts respecting the right to
compensation should be resolved in favor of the employee
or his dependents" and that the "Industrial Act must be
liberally construed." in an "attempt to effectuate its beneficient and humane objects" (Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 644), the rule is,
even, in those cases, that a "possibility" is not sufficient.
There~

is. one important distinguishing element between
the above cited Utah cases and the case at bar. In those
cases the question was whether the cause of the injury had
been sufficiently established. In the present case there is
the additional question, was there such an injury? The
distinction is important because when the existence of the
injury has been clearly established, then lay testimony may
corroborate medical testimony that the cause of. the injury
was the accident complained of. That is, courts have considered that when the injury is known (i. e. broken limbs,
disease, death) the fact that the condition of the person
grew progressively worse after the accident is some corroboration even for speculative medical testimony as to cause.
This is aptly pointed out by Justice Wolfe in Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Commission, supra, where it is said:
"When the event of accident is definite and injures a particular member or part of the body and
afterward disability or death occurs and the progres-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
sion toward disability or death can definitely be ascertained as beginning with the former event because the history of the progression directly involves a worsening of the member or part to which
the injury occurred or the evidence involves a connection between the trauma and other affected
parts in the history of the progressive worsening,
there will be sustaining evidence for an award."
In the Utah Fuel case it was clearly established that
the injured person was suffering from "carcinoma of the
testicle."
In the case at bar the fact that plaintiff's testimony
indicated trouble with his back and that such trouble began
after and not before the accident, is some evidence that the
accident may have caused a back injury. It is no evidence,
however, that the particular injury caused was a ruptured
disc. The jury was justified in concluding from such testimony that plaintiff had sprained or strained his back, as alleged, but it certainly was not within their grasp to determine
that he sustained a ruptured disc, when the medical expert,
taking into consideration the entire history of the injury,
was only able to state that this was "just a possible condition". In the case at bar there was no corroborating testimony as to the existence of a disc injury, nor could there
have been unless plaintiff had introduced other expert
witnesses. The case therefore falls within the rule that "a
possibility" is not sufficient evidence where the fact to be
proved must be established as a "reasonably certain probability."
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(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a causal

connection between the accident and the alleged disc injury.
As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, "a possibility" is not sufficient, under Utah law, to sustain a finding that the cause of an injury was the accident complained
of. It appears that this rule is universally accepted. A collection of the cases can be found in 135 A. L. R. 516 under
an annotation labeled "Sufficiency of expert evidence· to
establish causal relation between accident and physical
condition or death." The annotator there concludes:
"It appears to be well settled that medical testimony as to the possibility of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the subsequent
death or impaired physical or mental condition of the
person injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to
establish such relation. By testimony as to possibility is meant testimony in which the witness asserts that the accident or injury 'might have', 'may
have', or 'could have' caused, or 'possibly did' cause
the subsequent physical condition or death or that a
given physical condition (or death) 'might have',
'may have', or 'could have' resulted or 'possibly did'
result from a previous accident or injury-testimony, that is, which is confined to words indicating
the possibility or chance of the existence of the causal relation in question and does not include words
indicating the probability or likelihood of its existence.... "
A very good analysis of the problem is set out in
Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P. 2d 91. In that
case plaintiff sought recovery for injuries which allegedly
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were caused by an automobile accident. The court, ruling
that there was not sufficien.t evidence of the causal connection, said:
"We think that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff,
under the facts of this case, to prove not only that
the accident could have caused the injury, but that
. it probably did. This question has been considered
by numerous courts and the authorities have been
collected in the exhaustive note to the case of Burton
v. Holden and Martin Lumber Co., 112 Vt. 17, 20 A.
2d 99, 135 A. L. R. 512, where may be found most
of the cases in the United States up to that time
on the question; and the authorities clearly hold that
medical testimony as to the possibility of a causal
relation between a given accident or injury and the
subsequent impaired physical condition of the person injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish such a relation ...
"To us the evidence in this case does not measure up to that required in Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co. v. Kelly, supra. We quote from that opinion
[194 Okla. 646, 153 P. 2d 1012] : 'While there is
authority to the contrary, we are committed to the
rule that opinion evidence, such as that given by the
plaintiff's witnesses ... that a certain cause "might",
"could" or "possibly" did or would bring about a certain result is competent and may have some probative value. Glen L. Wigton Motor Co. v. Phillips,
163 Okla. 160, 21 P. 2d 751, and authorities there
cited. See also 20 Am. Jur. 733; L. R. A. 1915 A.,
at page 1070; 22 C. J. 721, notes 60 and 61; 32 C.
J. S. Evidence, § 556, p [age] 366, notes 20 and 21.
The value of such evidence is ordinarily for the trier
of the facts. But where such evidence is not corroborated or supplemented by other evidence, and
where the fact necessary to be established must be
proved by testimony of a qualified expert, such evi-
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dence, standing alone is generally held to be insufficient to make out a prima facie case. 135 A. L. R.
516-529, annotation.' The corroborating evidence
is lacking here.
"We also adhere to the rule that where an injury is of such character as to require skilled and
professional men to determine the cause thereof, the
question is one of science and must be proved by
their testimony.''
Quoting from the Missouri case of Hunt v. Armour &
Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S. W. 2d, 312, 316, the court went
on to say:
" 'It is now well settled that, in matters where
the evidence does not exclude all other causes and
in which no laymen could know or have any reasonable basis for an inference as to cause, opinions of
doctors that a certain occurrence or condition might,
could, or would produce a certain result is no more
than an assurance that such a result was scientifically possible, and does not alone constitute substantial evidence that such occurrence or condition did
cause it.' "
With this well defined rule in mind, we pass to a review
of the evidence in the case at bar.
As before, the only expert testimony bearing upon
causation was that given by Dr. Clegg. We refer the reader
to those portions of the transcript quoted under (a) supra
and particularly the following (R. 63) :
"Q.

. . . would you have an opinion as to

whether this condition you found in his back was
caused by the accident which I referred to?
"A. I d 0.
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What is your opinion.
"A. All I could say is that it is possible that
the accident eould either initiate it, or . . . ( objection)"
"Q.

A reading of this portion of the doctor's testimony in context reveals that the "condition" referred to was nerve irritation. Testimony following this indicates that the doctor
thought there was a possibility that the nerve irritation
was caused by a ruptured disc (R. 64, 65). There is no
direct medical testimony, however, that the injured disc
itself (if any) was caused by the incident of August 9th,
1951.
Assuming that there was a disc injury it is highly
speculative that it was caused by the accident. This was
pointed out by the doctor's testimony on cross examination
and particularly the following portions (R. 68-77) :
For instance, doctor, if these X-rays that
you have shown us, looking at those X-rays alone,
without any history, or without anything else, you
would not diagnose a disc, would you?
"A. No sir.
"Q.

You would not diagnose even anything abnormal, would you?
"A. That is correct.
"Q.

In other words, I think, as you said, the
X-rays themselves are quite normal? .
''A. Yes.
"Q.

"Q. So, so far as the X-rays are concerned,
objectively, they alone, do not indicate anything that
would justify you in diagnosing a disc?
"A. That is correct.
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"Q. Nor your neurological findings, as I understand you made some tests of his nerves going
up and down, testing the nerves up and down his
extremities; is that what you do, doctor?
"A. Yes.

I suppose you measure the thighs and
calves to see if there is any deterioration?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

In other words, if there is any serious
numbness of disability in the lower limbs, resulting
in this nerve impingement, you usually can find the
muscles aren't as large and of as good a tone as
usual; . isn't that right?
''A. Yes.
"Q.

"Q.

Did you find these muscles and legs nor-

mal?
"A. They are in good condition, within normal
limits....
Now referring, doctor, to these discs,
which you diagnose there was a possibility of a disc
impingement here, discs very frequently and commonly occur with people, without injury do they not?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

In other words, frequently, as we get
older, particularly if we have certain stresses and
strains in our life, these discs between our vertebra
will deteriorate until they get to the point where
they break?
"A. That is often the case.
"Q.

.i\.nd very frequently they get to that point
of deterioration if we reach over and pick up a coin,
we catch a little feeling there, and we have felt a
ruptured disc?
''A. Yes.
"Q.
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That does not mean the disc ruptured at
that point, does it doctor?
"A. No sir.
"Q.

*

*

*

*

*

So frequently people have such a condition
and have no pain, and do not know they have ruptured a disc?
"A. That is correct.
"Q.

That can occur through ordinary wear and
tear, we all go through?
"A. Yes, due generally to wear and tear.
"Q.

"Q. And frequently people will have this situation called to their attention when they roll over in
bed at night?
"A. That is one way, yes.

*

*

*

*

*

Now suppose with me, if you will, doctor,
that a man had as a vocation, and also as a hobby,
riding horses, and even bucking horses, and he broke
horses, participated in rodeos and calf roping, and
also on occasion, had ridden in the wild horse races,
and liked to do that sort of thing, would that shock
and stress and strain on a back in the saddle, have
some effect on a disc which was deteriorating to a
point it would be subject and suspect to rupture?
[That Moore had engaged in these activities is clearly shown by other portions of the record.]
''A. It certainly could.
"Q.

In other words, it is just the sort of thing
that could cause a disc to rupture if it were deteriorated, is it not?
"A. It is the type of physical activity which
would cause it, yes."
"Q.
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On re-direct Dr. Clegg testified (R. 82) :
"Q.

. . . What percentage of the difficulties,

as you have observed them, have been caused from
injury, and what percentage by disease; do I make
myself clear?
"A. About 40% of the disc injuries resulted
from injury, and about 60% resulted from what we
call known injury, rheumatics or all of the other
conditions."
The material portion of Moore's testimony was in substance that he had a good back before the incident of August
9th, and has suffered since that time. His suffering would
tend to show some injury was caused by the accident, but
again, it does not tend to show that the accident caused a
"disc injury" because there is just as strong an inference
that the sole injury he suffered was the back strain or
sprain which he alleged.
In summary, we find no medical testimony (either positive or conjectural) to support the causal connection and
the most that can be inferred is that there was a "possible"
connection. The lay testimony under the facts of this case
would not corroborate medical testimony even if there had
been some, because the worsening of plaintiff's condition
after the accident was just as likely attributable to Moore's
sprained back as to a supposed disc injury.
We submit that the facts of the case at bar bring this
case squarely within the rule laid down by this court in
Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v. Salisbury, supra, where
it was said:
"There is no positive or direct statement on the part
of the physicians' testifying that in their judgment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
the accident did accelerate the disease which caused
death, ... nor any fact proven from which it might
legally or reasonably be deduced that the accident
did accelerate the disease."
This being so, the Court should have granted defendant's requested Instruction No. 16 instructing the jury
that there was not sufficient evidence of a ruptured intervertebral disc to support a finding that plaintiff was suffering from such an injury.
(c) The trial court's refusal to withdraw the issue

of a disc injury from the jurors' consideration
was prejudicial.
Dr. Clegg, after testifying that it was "possible" that
Moore had a ruptured intervertebral disc, gave a detailed
and illustrated explanation of what was meant by the term
"ruptured disc" (R. 65, 66). The nature of such an inquiry
was firmly engrained in the minds of the jury, and most
likely influenced the jury a great deal in their determination of the damages. That plaintiff might be suffering from
such an injury was not brought to the jury in just a casual
manner.
In addition to the emphasis placed on the injury, it
appears from the evidence that the doctor's conclusion as
to a 5% disability was based upon the assumption that
plaintiff suffered a ruptured disc. With respect to this the
doctor said (R. 82. See also R. 67) :
"A. I feel the findings, the history of the physical findings, and X-ray changes that are present
following an injury, are sufficient to warrant the
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diagnosis of a possible disc injury, causing the 5%
per·manent partial disability." (Emphasis added.)
Had the jury been instructed that a finding of a disc injury was not warranted by the evidence the jury would
perhaps have totally rejected plaintiff's claim of permanent disability.
·Since it is impossible for this court to ascertain how
much damages were awarded to plaintiff by reason of the
alleged disc injury, or how much would have been awarded,
if any, had the jury not been permitted to speculate as to
the actual injuries sustained we submit that the case must
be reversed for a new trial.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 12 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE INSTRUCTED
THE TRIER OF FACT THAT "PLAINTIFF'S
ONLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT RAILROAD.
By Instruction No. 12, given at plaintiff's request, the
Court charged the jury· (R. 304) :
"That at the time of the occurrence involved
in this case plaintiff, Alfred Roger Moore, and defendant were mutually engaged in interstate com··
merce.
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"Under such circumstances the Statutes of the
States of Utah and Colorado covering Employer's
Liability and Workmen's Compensation are not applicable to this case and plaintiff's right to recover,
if any, he has, is based solely on the Statutes of the
United States covering the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees for injuries
caused while in the course of their employment."
Exceptions were duly taken upon the grounds that the
instruction was immaterial to any issue before the jury
and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 261).
We are unable to see any justification for an instruction on a point of law or fact so obviously abstract and
immaterial. Perhaps the trial judge viewed it as a cautionary measure, but whatever the reason for its use, it is clear
that plaintiff's right to recover for his injuries (if any) ,
under state laws, has no bearing whatsoever upon the issues
which the jury was required to decide ( i. e. negligence,
contributory negligence and damages).
The instruction was not only wholly foreign to issues
of the case, but calculated to engender sympathy and prejudice in the minds of the jury. The only reasonable conclusion which the jury could draw from the language used is
that the trial judge desired to impress upon their minds
that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his injuries under State law and that his sole recourse was against
the Railroad under Federal law. This, of course, was just
one way of informing the jurors that unless their verdict
required the defendant to pay for plaintiff's injuries,
plaintiff would have to pay for them himself. Such an appeal to sympathy is very likely to accomplish its purpose
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where the plaintiff, as in this case, is made to appear as a
man in financial distress, (R. 40), and the defendant, as
here, is a notably financially responsible corporation.
State workmen's compensation laws, are a form of
insurance; and therefore, Instruction No. 12 is tantamount
to an instruction that plaintiff is not covered by nor entitled to insurance proceeds as a result of his accident.
Whether the instruction was in fact calculated to have this
effect is beside the point; the important thing is that it did
have such an effect.
Evidence that plaintiff does not have insurance coverage is inadmissible and when the jury is allowed to consider
such testimony the error is prejudicial.
A case closely in point is Lee v. Osmundson, 206 Minn.
487, 289 N. W. 63. In that case the Minnesota Supreme
Court said:
"Over proper objection, counsel for plaintiff
made extensive inquiry to show that plaintiff had
only liability coverage. The obvious inference is
that he did not have collision insurance to protect
him from loss to his own property. This of course
was clearly inadmissible. It was foreign to the issues
of the case and immaterial to the proof of the cause
of action. Introduction of such testimony can serve
but one purpose. While we do not rely on this erroneous receipt of evidence as a basis for reversal because of subsequent developments in the procedure,
still we could not and would not approve a verdict
for plaintiff should he ultimately succeed if such
testimony were again introduced."
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In a more recent case, J eddeloh v. H ockenhull, 219 Minn.
541, 18 N. W. 2d 582, the same court quoted the above language with approval, saying:
"We are loath to upset verdicts and grant new
trials where fact issues are involved. Our duty is
clear, however, where the record shows that the
jury's attention was diverted from the main issues
by the erroneous admission of testimony which
would likely influence it in deciding the issues submitted by the Court. vVe gave due warning in Lee
v. Osmundson, 206 Minn. 487, 493, 289 N. W. 63,
65, supra, that we would not approve a j_ury verdict
where such testimony is received over objection ... "
The cases are uniform that evidence of insurance or
non-insurance is inadmissible in personal injury cases (with
some exceptions which are not applicable here). See Annotations in 56 A. L. R. 1418, supplemented in 74 A. L. R.
849, 95 A. L. R. 388, 105 A. L. R. 1319 and 4 A. L. R. 2d
761 (citing cases from 47 jurisdictions, in support of the
general rule). A number of very recent cases are cited in
the New Supplement Service for A. L. R. 2d Annotations.
That Utah is in accord with the general rule was
clearly established by Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.
2d 224, wherein Justice Folland stated:
"The universal rule is that it is irrelevant to
the issue of negligence whether the defendant is
carrying liability insurance or not and subject to
some qualification which need not be here mentioned
such testimony is wholly inadmissible."
An examination of the cases cited in the above annotations
reveals that where the jury has been informed of insurance
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or absence of insurance the error is prejudicial unless introduced inadvertently or to rebut evidence of insurance
already introduced, or unless the error is cured by instructions to disregard the testimony, and a number of cases
hold that even a subsequent instruction cannot cure the
error because of the extreme likelihood that the evidence
has done irreparable damage (see e. g. King v. Starr et al.,
43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P. 2d 351).
In the case at bar there was no evidence at trial that
plaintiff had insurance coverage (Workmen's Compensation) ; there was no justification whatsoever for the instruction and no action taken to cure the error. Here the jury
was informed of plaintiff's lack of insurance coverage
(Workmen's Compensation) by the trial judge. Coming
from the court who presides over the proceedings as an
impartial and unbiased participant, this information would
likely be given more weight and consideration than it would
have, had the declaration come from a witness or advocate.
Under these circumstances it seems to us manifest that an
appellate court cannot surmise that such error did not influence the verdict of the jury, and especially so where
the facts of the case indicate that the verdict appears to be
excessive.
The Mandate of the U. S. Supreme Court in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520 is
controlling here. In that case the highest court reversed
a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court which ordered
a remittitur in a case tried under the F. E. L. A. It was
held that the State court should have ordered a new trial.
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The opinion read :
"In actions. under the federal statute no verdict
can be permitted to stand which is found to be in
any degree the result of appeals to passion and
prejudice. Obviously such means may be quite as
effective to beget a wholly wrong verdict as to produce an excessive one. A litigant gaining a verdict
thereby will not be permitted the benefit of calculation, which can be little better than speculation, as
to the extent of the wrong inflicted upon his opponent."

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13 INVOLVING AN ISSUE
NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR
THE EVIDENCE AND NOT BEFORE THE
COURT OR THE JURY.
By Instruction No. 13, given at plaintiff's request the
court charged the jury ( R. 305) :
The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides as follows:
"That in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover for injuries to,
. . . any of its employees, such employee shall not
be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where such injury . . . resulted
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of
the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier;

"
Defendant duly excepted to the giving of the above
instruction on the ground that the question of whether or
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not the plaintiff does or does not assume the risk is immaterial to the issues of the case and the instruction is prejudicial to defendant (R. 261, 262).
45 U. S. C. A~· § 54, part of which is quoted in Instruction No. 13, provides that assumption of risk shall be no
defense to an action .brought under the F. E.· L. A. if the
plaintiff has been injured by the negligence of an employee
of a defendant railroad. Under the facts of the instant
case defendant could not and did not assert the doctrine
of ·assumption of risk as a defense. There was absolutely
nothing in the pleadings or the evidence that ·would in any
way intimate that assumption of risk was in issue.
We recognize that the giving of instructions on abstract
principles of law or fact, while improper, is often not
prejudicial, and that under the ·facts of this case, the giving of Instruction No. 13 may not have prejudiced the. defendant. Nevertheless, the instruction is one that is frequently requested by plaintiff's counsel in similar cases and
is accepted by some of the trial judges and rejected by
others. Because of this diversity of opinion at the trial
level, and because we think the instruction is improper and
harmful to the defendant, the issue should be decided for
this and future cases.
This court was confronted with the same question in
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649, Cert.
dismissed 65 S. Ct. 126, 323 U. S. 673, 89 L. Ed. 547. An
examination of the briefs in that case reveals that a virtually identical instruction was given by the trial court
and the same objection was raised by defendant. In that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
appeal plaintiff argued that it was the duty of the trial
judge to instruct the jury that assumption of risk was no
defense (see P. 85 of plaintiff's brief, case No. 6566) . Defendant, on the other hand, urged that in no case was it
proper to instruct the jury on abstract issues of law and
cited a Utah case, Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224
Pac. 285, to the effect that an instruction on assumption of
risk, though a proper statement of the law, is prejudicial
error when outside the issues of the case (see defendant's
brief, P. 42, case No. 6566). In Riding v. Roylance, supra,
the Utah court said :
"Appellant refers to many cases in support of
the proposition that an instruction is improper
which relates to matters outside the issues, or as
to which there is no substantial evidence. It is not
necessary to cite the authorities as the proposition
is elementary."
In the Bruner decision this court decided that under
the facts of the case presented the giving of the instruction
on assumption of risk was not prejudicial error concluding
that:
"Since we have held that the defendants were
negligent in other respects as a matter of law, they
could not have been prejudiced by this instruction.

''The same holds true as to Instruction # 11 on
the 'assumption of risk' doctrine. No such issue was
raised by the pleadings or the evidence and no good
purpose could have been served by the giving of such
instruction." (Emphasis added.)
This statement of law is not forceful enough to convince some of our trial judges that the instruction is im-
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proper and error, for notwithstanding the Bruner opinion
quoted above, the trial judge in this case, and district judges
in other cases continue to so instruct the jury. The instruction is actually a "straw man" injected into the case for
the purpose of conveying to the minds of jurors that the
law favors the injured worker over the defendant Railroad.
We submit that it is error to divert the minds of the jury
from the issues of the case by the giving of such an instruction, and that this court should so declare in language
that will assist the trial judges in determining the ·propriety of such an instruction in future cases. As to
whether it was prejudicial error, that question will have
to be decided upon the peculiar facts of this case. Unlike
the Bruner decision cited above, there is no element of
negligence as a matter of law, shown here.

POINT IV.
A GROSS A WARD OF $35,000.00 FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED INJURIES IS SO EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE AS TO COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES.
Defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 321) challenged
the. propriety of the jury's verdict and the· court's judgment
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on the verdict ( R. 320) . The jury assessed plaintiff's damages at $35,000.00 but cut the award in half by reason of
contributory negligence (R. 319A). Appeal was taken from
the order denying said motion (R. 323, 324).
Moore quit school after beginning the 11th grade and
never went back (R. 9). His first job was feeding cattle
for a man by the name of Manford in Greeley, Colorado.
He held this job for one year (R. 10). At the age of 18 he
enlisted in the Navy and served for seven and one~half years
as a signalman. Upon coming out of the Service in 1945,
he went to work for the American Express at Greeley,
Colorado (R. 10). He worked for the express company as
a laborer for one year (R. 10). In 1946 Moore was employed by the Blue Ribbon Bakery in Greeley, as a delivery
man, and in 1947 he went to work for Benton Land and
Livestock Co. feeding cattle and irrigating (R. 11). Thus
during the first ten years of his working career he served
five different employers and for seven and one-half of these
years he was in the Navy. In 1950 he went to work for the
defendant Railroad as a section laborer (R. 12). At this
time he was leasing a few acres of land upon which he
raised hay and grazed a few sheep (R. 12). His salary
while employed by defendant was about $256.00 per month.
At the time of the "accident" of August 9, 1951, Moore
was 31 years old and at the time of the trial, June, 1954,
he was 34 years old. He is married and has one stepchild.
Moore's employment after the accident was as unsteady as it had been before. In the month of January,
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1952, Moore quit the Railroad (R. 117). He had done quite
well on his sheep in 1951 (R. 57) and he continued to care
for these sheep until they were sold in July of 1953 (R.
40). On the 15th of July, 1952, he went to work stacking
hay (R. 47). He had no income from. this job because the
man for whom he worked was accepting his services as
payment for a debt. After the haystacking job during the
summer of 1952, Moore secured a job driving trucks for
a Vern Davis in Greenriver (R. 47). His salary was about
$400.00 per month. on this job, but he quit in March of 1953
(R. 48). In May of 1953 the Cater Construction Co. employed him as a laborer (R. 48). On direct examination
Moore testified that he was released from this job because
"I could not be steady". (R. 48), and also that he was not
"working. steady" because of his back (R. 130). It developed in cross examination that Moore had worked ten
and one-half hours a day digging post holes and hauling
and setting posts, five or six days per week while he was
employed by C.ater Construction Co. (R. 130-137 Ex. 9).
lVfoore explained that his idea of working steady was seven
days per week (R. 137). In July of 1953 Moore left the
Cater Construction Co., went to work for the Deardon
Lumber Co. at Burns, Colorado, and worked at this job
until March of 1954 when he was laid off because there
was no more work for him to do (R. 51). His testimony
was that the· work at the lumber company turning logs, was
"heavy" work requiring the use of back and legs (R. 145).
At the time of the trial Moore was employed driving an
oil truck for the Decker Trucking Co. at Greenriver, Utah
(R. 52).
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Moore's earning record before the accident as nearly
as he could estimate it was as follows (R. 54-57):
1945
1949
1950

$3,000.00
$2,900.00
$2,900.00

The income for 1949 and 1950 includes $1700.00 salary
plus $100.00 per month for groceries etc. which Moore received in addition to his salary (See R. 57). In 1951, the
year of the alleged injury Moore made approximately
$5,000.00 almost twice as much as the preceding years (R.
57). This was due to profit from his sheep (R. 57). (About
$3,000.00 from the Railroad and $2,000.00 from his sheep).
As to the extent of pain and suffering andjor temporary disability suffered by Moore, if any, defendant was
somewhat at the mercy of Moore because these are largely
subjective factors. The undisputed evidence including plaintiff's own medical testimony, however, directly opposes
the conclusion that Moore was seriously injured.
On the evening of the alleged injury Moore asked his
foreman, Foster, for a 30 day leave of absence to put up his
hay (R. 209-210, compare with R. 112). Foster testified
that Moore was given a temporary leave and that he came
back to work 13 or 14 days later. During that time Foster
saw Moore cutting hay (R. 211). His testimony was that
Moore had said absolutely nothing about his back in connection with the requested leave of absence (R. 211). In
October, 1951, just two months after the incident of August
9th, Moore obtained a leave to go on a pack trip elk hunting (R. 115). That same fall (1951) Moore testified that
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he taught some high school boys what he knew about boxing. When asked (R. 124) :
"Q. You recall boxing several rounds with
each of them?"

He replied:
"A.

I showed them a few pointers, yes."

Miss Dorothy Virden, testified that she watched Moore
boxing with the high school boys. She testified that he
stripped to the waist and boxed for one to two hours (R.
220-221). There was nothing which indicated to her that
Moore at that time was suffering from a bad back (R. 221).
During the fall of 1951, just a few weeks or months
after Moore's alleged injury he was observed as a regular
participant in community dances (R. 219-220).
In the spring of 1952, just a few months after the
alleged. back injury of August 1951, Moore entered a calf
roping contest (R. 118). This involved a timed competition between riders, the object being to see which "cowboy"
could rope a 250 pound calf from a running horse, jump
from the horse, throw the calf and tie three of its legs in
the shortest amount of time (R. 119).
During the early months of 1952 Moore rode horses
to take care of his sheep (R. 110). In the fall of 1952 he
again went elk hunting (R. 46).
In May of 1953, Moore went to work for the Cater
Construction Co. and worked ten and one-half hours per
day at least five days per week doing extremely heavy
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manual labor (hauling and setting poles) and yet never
complained about his back (Ex. 9, R. 317). Each job that
he has secured since August 9th has required strenuous
physical exertion.
In the fall of 1953, while working for the Deardon
Lumber Co. he was photographed rolling and chopping logs
with no apparent difficulty (R. 152). These movies were
introduced in evidence (R. 234, 235, 243) and shown to the
jury and spectators. Moore testified that the pictures accurately depicted his activity on the occasion (R. 152). One
of the defendant's witnesses, Dr. Lawrence N. Ossman, a
respected orthopedic specialist after viewing the pictures
said (R. 248) :
"A. From the pictures alone, I would say he
[Moore] had a per~ectly normal functioning back."
Plaintiff's own expert witness, Dr. Clegg, testified (R. 79) :
Would you expect that a person who acted
very freely, with no limitation of motion whatsoever,
and lifted heavy logs that weighed 2 or 3 hundred
pounds,-the end of them, and lifted them freely
with a canthook, and jumped and ran across the
tops of them,-would you expect that he was suffering any from any impairment of his back?
"Q.

"A. At that particular time I would expect he
had a good back.''
The moving pictures (Exhibits "1", "2" and "3") in connection with the testimony of the experts speak for themselves as to the extent of Moore's injuries, if any.
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The only medical testimony tending to indicate the
extent of injury aside from the doctor's statements in connection with the moving pictures was that given by Dr.
Clegg. He examined Moore in January of 1953, and again
in March of 1954. The X-rays taken of Moore's back according to the doctor's testimony were normal and might
well have been taken .from the back of any ordinary pe·rson
of Moore's age (R. 68, 69). There was "very slight" muscle
spasm ("tenseness of a muscle") (R. 74). The doctor gave
his opinion that at the time of the first examination Moore
was "slightly handicapped" (R. 80), and that at the time
of the second examination he was "very slightly handicapped" in motion (R. 80). It was the d6ctor's testimony
that due to the "possibility" of a disc injury (R. 82 lines
8-11) it was his opinion that Moore would suffer a 5%
permanent partial disability (R. 66). Even conceding, for
the purpose of argument, that the jury was justified in
finding a disc injury and thus a partial permanent disability the doctor's explanation of such a disability indicates
that it is very small indeed. Material portions of his testimony are (R. 73) :
Further, a 5% disability is a very minimal
percent of disability, isn't it?
"A. That is correct.
"Q.

That does not disqualify men, according
to your statement from manual labor?
"A. That's right.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

They can do manual labor?
They can do manual labor."
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Moore's condition at the time of second examination was
such that he could do "heavy work", the doctor said (R. 76).
No medical expenses were alleged or proved. Though
it was sh:)wn that Moore's income decreased after the injury it is not established that the decrease was due to the
injury. He made money on the sheep he had during the
year of his injury (1951) and he apparently devoted considerable time to his sheep thereafter. The fact that Moore's
sheep were unprofitable after the accident was no fault of
defendant. The unsteady nature of his employment is no
proof, by itself, that the alleged injury was the cause, because his employment before the accident was very irregular and unsteady. Had the jury believed all of Moore's
testimony, we feel that they could not have awarded in
excess of $1,000.00 for loss of wages.
I"'(

In summary, the evidence shows a very minimal physical disability, if any; some pain and suffering; a small
amount, if any, for loss of wages; and no medical expenses.
We do not think that this evidence can justify a verdict
which assesses plaintiff's damages as $35,000.00 (R. 319A).
That amount is over twelve (12) times the average annual
income of Moore for the two years preceding his alleged
injury. At present insurance rates, $35,000.00 would provide Moore at age 34 with an· $1800.00 per year annual
income for the rest of his life. (Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company [Milwaukee, Wis.] rate book for 1955.)
Invested at 6%, $35,000.00 would yield approximately
$160.00 income per month.
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Whether the damages in any instance are excessive,
must, of course, be determined in accordance with the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Under the
facts of the case at bar we think that it is manifest that
the verdict of the jury was influenced by passion and
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
It is most respectfully submitted that error of the trial
court in the proceedings below prevented defendant from
receiving a fair trial on the issues and resulted in a grossly
excessive award of damages, and that the judgment below
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
Counsel for Appellant.
The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company.
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